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POWER ON DIGRAPHS 
It is assumed that relations between n players are represented by a directed graph or digraph. Such 
a digraph is called invariant if there is a link (arc) between any two players between whom there is also 
a directed path. We characterize a class of power indices for invariant digraphs based on four axioms: 
Null player, Constant sum, Anonymity, and the Transfer property. This class is determined by 2n – 2 
parameters. By considering additional conditions about the effect of adding a directed link between two 
players, we single out three different, one-parameter families of power indices, reflecting several well- 
-known indices from the literature: the Copeland score, - and apex type indices. 
Keywords: digraph, power index, transfer property, link addition 
1. Introduction 
We consider situations where the relations between n players are reflected by 
a directed graph or digraph. There are several interpretations possible. A directed link 
(or arc) from player i to player j may reflect that player i controls player j, for instance 
i is an investor who has the majority of the shares in firm j. With this interpretation, our 
paper is related to Gambarelli and Owen [7], where the players are firms or investment 
companies. It is also a special case of the approach by Hu and Shapley [10, 11] and of 
the mutual control structures of Karos and Peters [12]. Somewhat related, our model 
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can also be seen as a permission structure as introduced by Gilles et al. [9]. A directed 
link from player i to player j then reflects the fact that player j  needs the permission of 
player i  in order to cooperate with other players. Still another interpretation of such 
a graph is as an information structure: player j can get information from player i  only 
if there is a directed link from player i to player j. These are applications where the links 
are between decision making agents. Other types of applications may have arcs 
representing the results of matches played among teams in a sports competition, or the 
structure of links between internet pages. 
A digraph will be called invariant if for any two players who are connected via 
a directed path, there is also a direct link. For instance, in the control interpretation, if 
player i controls player j  and j  controls k, then player j controls k  indirectly; in an 
invariant digraph there will be a direct link between i  and k. The term invariance refers 
to the fact that such indirect control relations are already included – alternatively, such 
digraphs are often called transitive. 
Our aim in this paper is to study power indices, reflecting the power of players as 
a consequence of their positions in the digraph. We impose four axioms on a power 
index: Null player, Constant sum, Anonymity, and the Transfer property. The Transfer 
property (first introduced in a different format by Dubey [3]) is an additivity condition 
in the spirit of [14]. It is the main tool to ensure that a power index is completely 
determined by its values on digraphs of an elementary form. In such elementary 
digraphs, there is a set M of players who each have a link to one and the same player j. 
Due to the Anonymity condition, only the cardinality of M  matters, but it makes 
a difference whether or not player j is in M: this is why we arrive at a class of power 
indices with 2( 1)n  degrees of freedom (parameters)4. The Null player axiom ensures 
that players outside M  (other than possibly j) have zero power. Combined with the 
Constant sum axiom, we obtain that the sum of the players’ powers is always 0. This is 
in contrast with classical power indices (e.g., [15], see also [6, 8, 1]), where power is 
between 0 and 1, and sums to 1. In our approach, it is natural to allow negative power. 
A null player is a player who has neither incoming nor outgoing links in the digraph, 
and it is natural to assign power 0 to such a player. In turn then, it is equally natural to 
allow negative power for a player who has only incoming links. 
An invariant digraph is a special case of an invariant mutual control structure 
studied by Karos and Peters [12]. Our main result here (Theorem 4.4) is related to the 
main result in [12], but the axioms imposed in the present paper are weaker, since they 
apply to power indices on a considerably smaller class of mutual control structures. 
Therefore, compared to that result, Theorem 4.4 requires a new and different, though 
less complicated, proof. 
 _________________________  
4More precisely, by the Null player and Constant sum axioms the case where = { }M j  is determined, 
so that by Anonymity we have n – 1 cases with ,j M and n – 1 cases with .j M  
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The Constant sum axiom and the possibility of negative power are two features by 
which the indices in this paper distinguish themselves from digraph power measures 
such as the outdegree and -measure, axiomatized by van den Brink and Gilles [18], 
which both satisfy a normalization that implies that the sum of the powers of the players 
depends on the digraph. We find three subclasses, related to the Copeland score,  
-measure and apex-measure, by imposing three different additional conditions with 
respect to link addition5. First, we impose the condition that adding a link from player i 
to player j does not change the power of the players who already had a link to player j. 
This may make sense, for instance, in a situation where player j has to do tasks for 
players who have a link to j – assuming there is no capacity constraint on what player j 
can do. Imposing this condition (called Link addition 1) on top of the four basic 
conditions above singles out a one-parameter family of power indices closely related to 
the Copeland score [2] from social choice theory: the power of a player is proportional 
to the number of players to whom he has a link minus the number of players who have 
a link to him. 
The next condition requires that adding a link does not change the power of player j to 
whom this link is incoming. This implies that the players that already had a link to j now 
have to share the power they had with the newcomer. Also, this condition (Link addition 2) 
singles out a one-parameter family of power indices, this time closely related to the 
concept of a -measure, as in [17, 18]. 
The final condition that we consider (Link addition 3) requires that adding a link 
from player i to player j equally increases or reduces the power of i  and j. Again, we 
obtain a one-parameter family of power indices, with the property that incoming links 
have no effect on a player’s power. These power indices are similar to the apex-type 
power index in [16]. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces invariant digraphs, 
Section 3 the main axioms for a power index, Section 4 the main characterization result, 
and Section 5 the refinements based on Link addition axioms. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Preliminaries 
For a set A  we denote by ( )P A  the set of all subsets of A, and by 
0 ( )P A  the set of 
all nonempty subsets of A. By | |A  we denote the number of elements of A. 
 _________________________  
5The effect of link addition was introduced in communication graph games by Myerson [13], who 
introduced the axiom of fairness, stating that deleting an undirected communication link between two play-
ers has the same effect on their payoffs. Together with so-called component efficiency this characterizes 
a Shapley type solution, later referred to as the Myerson value. 
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Let ={1, ..., }N n  with 2n   denote the set of players. Elements of ( )P N  are 
called coalitions. A directed graph or digraph on N is a map : ( ) ( )C P N P N  satisfy-
ing ( ) =C    and ( ) = ( )i SC S C i  for every 0( ).S P N  Hence, a digraph C is com-
pletely determined by its values ( )C i  for .i N  The graphical interpretation of a di-
graph C is, indeed, that there is a link from i N  to j N  if and only if ( )j C i 6. As 
mentioned in the Introduction, various interpretations with respect to applications are 
possible. The set ( )C i  can be interpreted as the set of players controlled by player i  
(cf. [10–12]), or the set of players who need permission from i  [9]; or the set of players 
to whom player i  can communicate, etc. The reason for defining a digraph not just for 
singletons lies in the axiomatic approach to power indices presented later on. Observe 
that a digraph C  is trivially monotonic: if , ( )S T P N  and S T  then ( ) ( ).C S C T  
For a digraph C, a directed path from i N  to j N  is a sequence 
1 2 2 3( , ), ( , ),i i i i  
1..., ( , )k ki i N N    for some kN  such that 1 ( )i C i   for each =1, ..., ,k 1= ,i i  
and 
1= .kj i   A digraph C is invariant if for all , ,i j N  if there is a directed path from 
i  to j, then jC(i)7. The expression “invariant” refers to the fact that in an invariant 
digraph adding a link between players having a directed path connecting them, does not 
change the digraph. 
Note that an arbitrary digraph can be made invariant by simply adding links for 
every pair of players between whom there exists a directed path. The following 
observation, the easy proof of which is omitted, will be useful in the sequel. 
Lemma 2.1. Let C be a digraph. Then C is invariant if and only if ( ( ))C i C i
= ( )C i  for all .i N   
We denote the set of all digraphs (on N) by D  and the set of all invariant digraphs by D*. 
In the sequel, the following observations will be relevant. For ,C DD  define C D  
and C D  by ( )( ) = ( ) ( )C D S C S D S   and ( )( ) = ( ) ( )C D S C S D S   for all 
( ).S P N Then ,C D D  but even if *,C DD  then it does not necessarily follow 
that *.C D D  See the following example. 
Example 2.2. Let ={1, 2, 3}N  and let *,C DD  be defined by (1) = 2,C
(2) = 3,D  and ( ) =C i   and ( ) =D i   in the remaining cases8. Then ( )(1) = 2C D  
 _________________________  
6Usually, what we call players are called nodes or vertices in a digraph. Because of the applications 
we have in mind, we refer to them as players. 
7In the literature, these digraphs are usually referred to as transitive digraphs. 
8Here and elsewhere we often omit set braces if confusion is unlikely. 
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and ( )(2) = 3C D  but 3 ( )(1),C D   so that *.C D D  (See also Remark 2.9 in 
[12].) 
Further, if *, ,C DD  then it does not necessarily follow that ,C D D  but if 
,C D D then also *.C D D  The latter is straightforward to prove by using 
Lemma 2.1; for the former see the following example. 
Example 2.3. Let 4n   and let (1) = 3,C  (2) = 4,C  (1) = 4,D  (2) = 3,D  and 
( ) = ( ) =C i D i   for all 1, 2.i  Then *, ,C DD  but ,C D D since ( )( ) =C D i   
for all i, but ( )(12) = 34.C D  
Example 2.3 in fact shows that our definition of the intersection C D  of two 
digraphs cannot be restricted to taking intersections for singleton coalitions only and 
then extending to arbitrary coalitions by taking unions. 
3. Axioms for a power index 
We consider power indices for invariant digraphs. A power index is a map 
*: .N D R  We propose four basic axioms, in the spirit of the standard axioms of the 
Shapley [14] value for cooperative games. We will then prove that these four axioms 
characterize a large, 2(n – 1)-parameter family of power indices. 
Player i N  is a null player in *CD  if ( ) =C i   and ( ) :i C N i.e. player i  is 
an isolated node in the digraph. The digraph in which every player is a null player, is 
denoted by O, i.e., ( ) =O S   for all .S N  This corresponds to a graph without any 
links. 
The first axiom requires that null players have zero power. 
Null Player (NP). ( ) = 0i C  for every null player i in C, for every 
*.CD  
The second axiom states that the sum of the powers of all the players is the same 
for any digraph. 
Constant sum (CS). ( ) = ( )i ii N i NC D     for all 
*, .C DD  
The combination of these two axioms has as a simple consequence that the powers 
of all the players in a digraph always add up to zero. 
Lemma 3.1. Let   be a power index satisfying NP and CS. Then ( ) = 0ii N C  
for every *.CD  
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Proof. By NP, ( ) = 0i O  for every .i N  Hence, by CS, ( )ii N C
= ( ) = 0ii N O  for every 
*.CD  □ 
Usually in the literature, power indices take values between 0 and 1 and sum up to 
1 (e.g., [15]). In our case, we allow the possibility that power can be negative. Typically, 
for instance, player j with ( ) =C j  , but ( )j C i  for some other player i, seems to 
have less power than a null player, so that we may wish to assign negative power to 
such a player. A null player in a simple game does not add any power to any coalition. 
However, in a simple game players cannot be subordinate to other players, so that a null 
player is then a player with minimal power. In our model, this is different, and there can 
be players who have less power than a “null player”. The expression null player suits 
its definition above well, whether in its quantitative meaning of “zero”, or in its 
qualitative meaning of “without value or consequence, amounting to nothing”. 
Let :N N   be a permutation. Then for *CD  we define *C D  by 
1( )( ) = ( ( ( )))C S C S     
The next axiom is standard9. 
Anonymity (AN). ( ) ( ) = ( )i iC C    for every player ,i N  every permutation  
of N, and every *.CD  
The final axiom replaces the usual additivity condition known from the Shapley 
value. For cooperative games, it was first introduced by Dubey [3] in the format (1) 
presented in the next section. See, further, [4, 5]. 
Transfer property (TP). ( ) ( ) = ( ) ( )C C D D       for all *, , ,C C D D D  
such that ,C C   ,D D   and ( ) \ ( ) = ( ) \ ( )C S C S D S D S   for every .S N  
An alternative and stronger version of the Transfer property would be obtained by 
imposing the condition ( ) \ ( ) = ( ) \ ( )C S C S D S D S   only for singletons, i.e., replacing 
it by ( ) \ ( ) = ( ) \ ( )C i C i D i D i   for every .i N  This, however, is too strong for our 
purposes: it would have the same effect as adding the Link addition 1 condition, see 
Section 5, and it would exclude other power indices, for instance those characterized in 
that section. 
 _________________________  
9Nevertheless, it may be interesting to investigate the consequences of dropping this condition and 
assuming that there may be asymmetries between the players apart from those resulting from the digraphs. 
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4. Characterization of power indices satisfying NP, CS, AN, and TP 
The main result of this section is Theorem 4.4, which is a characterization of all 
power indices satisfying Null player, Constant sum, Anonymity, and the Transfer 
property. We start out by proving a consequence of the Transfer property. 
Lemma 4.1. Let   be a power index satisfying TP. Then 
 ( ) ( ) = ( ) ( )C D C D C D        (1) 
for all *,C DD  with *, .C D C D  D  
Proof. Let *,C DD  with *, .C D C D  D  Clearly, 
( ( ) ( )) \ ( ) = ( ) \ ( ( ) ( ))C S D S C S D S C S D S   
for all .S N  Hence by TP, ( ) ( ) = ( ) ( )C D C D C D       , implying (1). □ 
For *CD  and j N  we define the digraph jC  by 
{ } if ( )
( ) =
otherwise
j
j j C i
C i



 
It is easy to see that *.jC D  Observe that in a graphical representation of jC , the 
graph has only links pointing to j, namely from those players i with ( )j C i . 
Lemma 4.2. Let   be a power index satisfying TP and NP, and let *.CD  Then 
( ) = ( )jj NC C  . 
Proof. We first show that *
k T kC D  for every 0 ( ).T P N  Let 0, ( ),S T P N  then 
( ) = ( ) = ( )k k k
k T k T j S j S k T
C S C j C j
    
 
which implies that .k T kC D  Let i N  and ( ( ( ))),k T k h T hj C i C i     then there 
exists an T  such that ( ( ( ))).h T hj C i C i    In turn, since ,C D  this implies 
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that ( )j C i  or there exists an m T  such that ( ).mj C i  Hence, ( )k T kj C i , so 
( ( ( ))) ( ).k T k h T h k T kC i C i C i       The converse inclusion follows by monotonicity. 
Hence *
k T kC D  by Lemma 2.1. 
Next, for every 
0 ( )T P N  and ,k T we have 
*( ) =k TC C O  D  (the empty 
digraph). By NP, ( ) = 0 .nO R  Also, = .i N iC C  
By the preceding arguments and by repeatedly applying (1), we obtain 
1 =2, , 1 =2, , 1 =2, ,
1 =2, ,
( ) = ( ( )) = ( ) ( ) ( ( ))
= ( ) ( ) = ( ),
i n i i n i i n i
i n i j
j N
C C C C C C C
C C C
    
  

      
  
 
which concludes the proof of the lemma. □ 
By Lemma 4.2 we may concentrate on digraphs of the form jC . More generally, 
for 
0 ( )M P N  and j N  the digraph ,M jU  is defined by 
 ,
{ } if
( ) =
otherwise
M j
j i M
U i



 (2) 
Clearly, ,M jU  is invariant. 
Lemma 4.3. Let the power index   on *D  satisfy NP, CS, and AN. Then there 
exist 0 1 1 1, , ..., , , ...,n n     R, with 0=0,= 10   such that for every )(NPM   
and ,j N  with = | |m M : 
(a) if ,j M  then for every Ni  
,
0 if 
( ) = / if 
if =
i M j m
m
i M j
U m i M
i j
 

 



 
 (b) if ,j M  then for every Ni  
,
0 if
( ) = / if \
/ if =
i M j m
m m
M
U m i M j
m i j
 
 



 
 
Proof. Straightforward from the axioms. □ 
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Observe that for *CD  and ,j N we have 
,
= C
jj
j M
C U  where = { : ( )}CjM i N j C i   
From Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 we obtain our main result. 
Theorem 4.4. A power index   on *D  satisfies NP, CS, AN, and TP if and only if 
there exist 
0 1 1 1, , ..., , , ...,n n     R,  with 0 = 0  and 1 = 0,  such that for each 
*CD  we have ( ) = ( ),jj NC C   with each ,( ) = ( )C jjj MC U   defined as in (a) and 
(b) of Lemma 4.3.  
Proof. The only-if direction follows from Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3. For the if-direction, let 
0 1 1 1, , ..., , , ..., ,n n     R with 0=0  and 1 = 0, and with ( ) = ( ),jj NC C  where 
each 
,
( ) = ( )C
jj
j M
C U   is defined as in (a) and (b) of Lemma 4.3. It is obvious that   
satisfies AN and CS. For NP, note that i is a null player in *CD  if and only if =iC O  
and 
C
jMi  for all .j N  This implies that 0=)( ji C  for all Nj  and therefore 
( ) = 0.i C  
For TP, let *, , , (HTML translation failed)C C D D D    such that ,C C   
,D D   and )(\)(=)(\)( SDSDSCSC   for every .S N  Then it is straight- 
forward to show that ,j jC C   ,j jD D   and \ = \j j j jC C D D   for all .j N  Hence, to 
show TP, it is sufficient to show that 
)()(=)()( jjjj DDCC    (*)  
 for all .j N  Now fix j and observe that jj CC   and jj DD   imply 
C
j
C
j MM 

 
and .D Dj jM M

  If = ,C Cj jM M

 then jj CC =  and therefore = ,j jD D  so that (*)  
follows. Otherwise, both 
C
j
C
j MM 

 and 
D
j
D
j MM 

 (where   denotes strict in-
clusion). Then, for 
C
jMNS

\=  we have ( ) \ ( ) = { } = ( ) \ ( ).j j j jC S C S j D S D S   This 
implies = ,DjS M

   hence .D Cj jM M
 
  Similarly, ,C Dj jM M
 
  hence = .D Cj jM M
 
 
This implies that also = ,D Cj jM M  so jj DC =  and = ,j jC D   and (*)  follows again. □ 
In the concluding Section 6 we provide examples to show that the four axioms in 
Theorem 4.4 are logically independent. In the next section we consider specific 
subclasses of the family of power indices satisfying the conditions of Theorem 4.4, 
following from the possible effects of adding links in a digraph. Here, we suggest 
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a scaling condition on a power index   by which we can single out a unique member 
of this family10. 
Scaling (SC). For all *CD  
 If ,j N  ( ) =C j  , and ( )j C k  for some ,k N  then ( ) = 1.j C   
 If , ,i j N  ( ) = ( ),C i C j  ( )j C k  for some ,k N  ( )i C k  for all ,k N then 
( ) = ( ) 1j iC C   . 
The first bullet point fixes the power of a player without any outgoing link but with 
at least one incoming link to 1 . The second point fixes the difference in power between 
two players with the same outgoing links to 1, if one player has no incoming links but 
the other player has at least one incoming link. We leave the proof of the following 
corollary to the reader. Denote a power index   as in Theorem 4.4 by , ,   where 
1
1 1= ( , ..., )
n
n  

 R  and 
1
2= ( , ..., ) .
n
n  
R  
Corollary 4.5. A power index   on *D  satisfies NP, CS, AN, TP, and SC if and 
only if ,=     with = = (1, ..., 1).   
Clearly, in the digraph O , which has no arcs at all, every power index ,   assigns 
0 to every player. We conclude with a consideration of the following question: for which 
digraphs do all players have zero power? 
Remark 4.6. Suppose that every component of a digraph *CD  is a complete 
graph on the nodes in that component, i.e., for all ,i j  in the same component there is 
a link from i  to j, as well as a link from j  to i; in particular, there is a link from i  to i. 
Then it can be deduced from the description in Lemma 4.3 that , ( ) = (0, ..., 0)C   for 
every power index satisfying the conditions in Theorem 4.4. Examples of such digraphs 
are the complete digraph on all nodes (players), which is the invariant digraph associated 
with, for instance, a circular digraph; and the digraph without any links, where all the 
players are isolated and therefore null players. 
5. Adding links: Copeland, - and apex type indices 
In this section we consider the class of power indices characterized in Theorem 4.4 
and study refinements following from the effect of adding a directed link (arc) between 
 _________________________  
10This axiom is similar to the Controlled player axiom in [12]. 
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player i  and player j . Let   denote the class of all power indices satisfying NP, CS, 
AN, and TP. As above, a generic element of   is denoted as , ,   where 
1
1 1= ( , ..., )
n
n  

 R  and 
1
2= ( , ...., ) .
n
n  
R  
The first axiom says that if we add an additional link to player j  from player i, then 
this should not change the power of the players who already have a link to j. In the 
parlance of control or permission: if player j  becomes additionally controlled by some 
player i, then this should not change the power of the players who were already 
controlling j. 
Recall that for a digraph *CD  and player j, CjM  is the set of players with a link 
to j, i.e., = { : ( )}.CjM i N j C i   
Link addition 1 (LA1). ( ) = ( )h hC C    for all 
*, ,C CD  ,j N  and \{ },Cjh M j
such that there is i N  with ,Cji M  ( ) = ( ) { }C i C i j   and ( ) = ( )C C  for all 
\{ }N i . 
Theorem 5.1. Let ,= .     Then   satisfies LA1 if and only if there exists 
a cR  such that =k kc  for all =1, ..., 1k n  and =k kc  for all = 2, ..., .k n  
Thus, under LA1 we obtain a one-parameter family of power indices of the form 
  
( )
( ) = | | = | ( ) | | |c C Ci i i
j C i
C c M c c C i M

   (3) 
where cR.  For instance, for = 1c  and using the terminology of control, the power of 
player i  is equal to the number of players controlled by player i  minus the number of 
players controlling player i, which yields the Copeland score in social choice theory 
[2]11, 12 
Proof. For the if-direction let cR  and let c  be as in (3). We show that c  
satisfies LA1. Let , , , ,C C h j i  be as in the statement of the axiom. Then h i  and 
therefore ( ) = (| ( ) | | |) = (| ( ) | | |) = ( ).c C C ch h h hC c C h M c C h M C 
    
 _________________________  
11In the social choice theory, for a given preference profile the Copeland score of an alternative x is 
the number of alternatives beaten by x minus the number of alternatives beating x in pairwise comparison. 
12An alternative way of characterizing the class { : }
c
c R  is by strengthening the transfer property 
in the way indicated at the end of Section 3. 
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For the only-if direction, let ,=      satisfy LA1. First suppose 0 ( )M P N  
and , \i j N M  with i j  and | |=M k  for some {1, ..., 2}.k n   Then for ,h M
by LA1 with ,M jU  in the role of C  and { },M i jU   in the role of ,C  
, { },( ) = ( )h M j h M i jU U   , hence 1/ = /( 1).k kk k     Let 1= ,c   then this implies that 
=k kc  for all =1, ..., 1.k n Now suppose 0 ( )M P N  with j M   and 
| |= {1, ..., 1}.M k n    For ,h M   again by LA1, , { },( ) = ( ),h M j h M j jU U    hence 
1/ = /( 1).k kk k     This implies =k kc  for all = 2, ..., 1.k n  □ 
The following axiom requires that it is player j  whose power does not change if an 
additional link is added from some player i  to j. In terms of control: if a player j 
becomes additionally controlled by some player i  then this should not change the 
power of player j. 
Link addition 2 (LA2). ( ) = ( )j jC C    for all 
*, ,C CD j N  with \{ } ,CjM j  
and i N  with ,Cji M ( ) = ( ) { }C i C i j   and ( ) = ( )C C  for all \{ }N i . 
Theorem 5.2. Let ,= .    Then   satisfies LA2 if and only if there exists 
a cR  such that =k c  for all =1, ..., 1k n  and =
1
k
k
c
k


 for all = 2, ..., .k n  
The power indices characterized in Theorem 5.2 take the form 
 
{ }
( )\{ }
( ) = 1
| \{ }|
c
i CC M
ij C i i j
c
C c
M j



  (4) 
where { }1 =1P  if statement P  is true and { }1 = 0P  otherwise. A power index 
c  is 
similar to the idea of the -measure as in van den Brink and Gilles [18] or its reflexive 
variant in van den Brink and Borm [17]: if player i  has a link to player j, then he equally 
shares the amount of power c  with the other players linked to j, except possibly j13. The 
difference is that player j loses c in power. 
 _________________________  
13The  measure is introduced for irreflexive digraphs (i.e. ( )i C i  for all )i N and assigns to 
player i in irreflexive digraph C the score 
( )
( ) = 1/ .Ci j
j C i
C M

  Its reflexive variant assigns the score 
 refl
( ) { }
( ) = 1/ | | 1 .Ci j
j C i i
C M
 
  The difference between the two lies in whether the set of loops is taken 
into account or not. So, the reflexive variant equals the  measure of the reflexive digraph obtained by 
adding all loops ( ( )i C i  for all ).i N  
Power on digraphs 119 
Proof. For the if-direction let cR  and c  be defined as in (4). We show that c  
satisfies LA2. Let , , ,C C j i  be as in the statement of the axiom, then 
( )\{ }
( ) =
| \{ }|
c
j C
C j j
c
C c
M



( )\{ }
=
| \{ }|CC j j
c
c
M


 = ( )cj C   
as is straightforward to verify, both for the case i j  and for the case =i j . 
For the only-if direction, let ,=      satisfy LA2. First suppose 0 ( )M P N  
and , \i j N M  with i j  and | |=M k  for some {1, ..., 2}.k n   Then by LA2, with 
,M jU  in the role of C  and { },M i jU   in the role of ,C   , { },( ) = ( ),j M j j M i jU U    hence 
1= .k k    Let 1= ,c   then this implies that =k c  for all =1, ..., 1.k n  Now suppose 
0 ( )M P N  with j M   and | |= {1, ..., 1}.M k n   Again by LA2, 
, { },( ) = ( ),j M j j M j jU U    hence by the previous argument, 
1
1 1= = ,
1 1
k
k k
k
c
k k

   


 
 
and thus 
1
1
= ,k
k
c
k
 

 which implies that =
1
k
k
c
k


 for all = 2, , 1k n . □ 
The final axiom we consider says that if we add a link from player i to player j then 
both have the same gain or loss in power. 
Link addition 3 (LA3). ( ) ( ) = ( ) ( )i i j jC C C C       for all 
*, ,C CD  j N  
with ,CjM    and i N  with ,
C
ji M  ( ) = ( ) { }C i C i j   and ( ) = ( )C C  for all 
\{ }N i . 
Theorem 5.3. Let ,= .    Then   satisfies LA3 if and only if there exists 
a cR  such that 
2
=
1
k c
k


 for all =1, ..., 1,k n  and = 0k  for all = 2, ..., .k n  
The power indices characterized in Theorem 5.3 take the form 
 
| |
| | { , ( )}
( )\ ( )
( ) = 1
| |
CM
jc
i C CC M M i C i
i ij C i C j j
C
M

 
 

  (5) 
with 
k  as in Theorem 5.3. In terms of control, according to a power index ,
c  if player j 
controls himself, then no player, including player j, derives (positive or negative) power 
from controlling j. Further, the (negative, if > 0)c power from being controlled 
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decreases and converges to zero as the number of controlling players increases. We note 
that 
c  is related to the apex power index in [16]14. 
Proof. For the if-direction let cR  and c  be defined as in (5). We show that 
c  satisfies LA3. Let , , ,C C j i  be as in the statement of the axiom, and 
=| | {1, ..., 1}.Cjk M n   First, if ,
C
jj M  ,i j  then 
1 2( ) ( ) = =
1 ( 1)( 2)
c c k
i i
c
C C
k k k

   
  
 
and 
1
2
( ) ( ) = =
( 1)( 2)
c c
j j k k
c
C C
k k
      
 
 
so that LA3 holds. Second, if ,Cjj M  ,i j  then 
1( ) ( ) = = 0
1
c c k
i iC C
k

   

 
and 
1
1( ) ( ) = ( ) = 0
1
c c k k
j j k kC C
k k
 
        

 
Thus LA3 also holds here. 
For the only-if direction, let ,=      satisfy LA3. First suppose 0 ( )M P N  and 
, \i j N M  with i j  and | |=M k  for some {1, ..., 2}.k n  Then { },( )j M i jU 
, 1( ) = ,j M j k kU      whereas { }, , 1( ) ( ) = /( 1).i M i j i M j kU U k      By LA3 with 
,M jU  in the role of C  and { },M i jU   in the role of ,C  this implies 
2
=
1
k c
k


 for all 
=1, ..., 1k n  with 1 = .c  
 _________________________  
14The apex-measure is introduced for irreflexive digraphs and assigns to player i in an irreflexive di-
graph C the score      
{ }
( )
( ) = 2/ | | (| | 1) | | 1/ | 1 1 .C C C Ci j j i i CM
ij C i
a C M M M M


     It can be defined 
for reflexive digraphs in an obvious way. 
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Now suppose 
0 ( )M P N  with ,j M  ,i M   and | |= {1, , 1}.M k n   Then 
{ }, , 1( ) ( ) = /( 1) ( 1) / ,j M i j j M j k kU U k k k k           and { }, ,( ) ( )i M i j i M jU U   
1= /( 1).k k    By LA3, this implies 1 = (( 1)/ )k kk k    for all {1, ..., 1}.k n  Since 
1 = 0,  it follows that = 0k  for all = 2, ..., .k n  □ 
Remark 5.4. If we weaken LA3 to condition LA3 by strengthening the premiss that 
C
jM    to \{ }
C
jM j    as in LA1 and LA2, then we obtain a two-parameter family: 
there exists a cR  such that 
2
=
1
k c
k


 for all k = 1, ..., n – 1, and d R  such that 
1
=
1
k d
k


 for all = 2, ..., .k n We omit the proof of this claim. 
6. Concluding remarks 
We provide a summary and further relations with the literature, and finally show 
that the axioms in Theorem 4.4 are independent. 
6.1. Summary and further relations with the literature 
We axiomatized a class of power indices for invariant digraphs using the axioms of 
Constant sum, Anonymity, Null player and the Transfer property, inspired by Karos and 
Peters [12], see Theorem 4.4. By adding one of the three considered link addition 
axioms, in each case we obtained a subclass of indices related to the Copeland score,  
-measure and apex-measure, respectively. One main difference related to the last two 
measures is that these satisfy a normalization condition where the total sum of the 
powers of all the players depends on the digraph, whereas for the indices defined in this 
paper, this sum is always zero. As a consequence, in the present paper players can have 
negative power, which is not possible according to the -measure and apex-measure. 
The - and apex-measures also satisfy the Anonymity and Null player axioms, and 
the -measure even satisfies a stronger version of NP, in which every player who has 
no outgoing arcs has power zero. As we saw above, the Transfer and Null player 
properties imply that we can find the power values for a digraph by adding up the power 
values over special elementary digraphs, one associated with each player, where such 
a digraph consists of all the links going into this player (see Lemma 4.2). For digraphs 
this is also implied by the property of Additivity over Independent partitions used by 
van den Brink and Gilles [18] to axiomatize the outdegree and -measure, which 
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requires that the power index for a digraph is the sum of the powers in a partition of the 
digraph such that every player has a positive indegree in at most one subgraph in the 
partition. 
The Copeland score for digraphs assigns to each player the difference between its 
outdegree and indegree. Therefore, the power indices satisfying LA1 characterized in 
Theorem 5.1 can be seen as multiples of the Copeland score. 
The power indices characterized by adding LA2 (see Theorem 5.2) are similar to 
multiples of the -measure, with the exception that players who are dominated but do 
not dominate have negative power, while they have zero power according to the -measure 
(and even positive power according to the reflexive -measure). This corresponds well 
with the interpretation of mutual control. 
The power indices characterized by adding LA3 (see Theorem 5.3) are similar to 
multiples of the apex-measure, with the exception that players who are dominated but 
do not dominate have negative power, while they have positive power according to the 
apex-measure. Similar to the apex-measure, according to these indices, a player who is 
dominated obtains a greater power if he becomes dominated by more predecessors. This 
reflects the concept that control over a player decreases when more players formally 
have control over this player, and therefore its level of self-control increases but will 
never become positive. 
We illustrate the different classes of power indices we considered here by an 
example. 
Example 6.1. For ={1, ..., }N n  and \{ },k N n consider the structures *k
nC D  
given by ( ) ={ }knC i n  for all {1, ..., },i k  and ( ) =
k
nC i   otherwise. In Table 1, we 
give the powers of the successor n  and predecessors C
ni M  for various numbers of 
predecessors. 
Table 1. Power indices for Example 6.1 
   1    2    3    4    ...   k   
,c Ci ni M     c    c    c    c    ...   c   
c
n    c   2c   3c   4c   ...   kc  
,
c
C
i ni M     c    2
c
   
3
c
   
4
c
   ...   
c
k
  
c
n    c    c    c    c    ...   c   
,c Ci ni M     c    
3
c
   
6
c
   
10
c
   ...   
2
( 1)
c
k k 
  
c
n    c   
2
3
c
   
2
c
   
2
5
c
    ...   
2
1
c
k


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Finally, we remark that for an arbitrary digraph CD  one could define 
*( ) = ( ),C C   where *C  is the invariant extension of C  obtained as explained in 
Section 2, namely by adding links for each pair of players between whom there exists 
a directed path. 
6.2. Independence of the axioms in Theorem 4.4 
By providing four examples, we show that the axioms in the main characterization, 
Theorem 4.4, are logically independent. 
Not NP, but CS, AN, TP. For *,M jU D  with ={ }M j  define ,( ) =1/( 1)i M jU n   
for all \{ }i N j  and ,( ) = 1j M jU  . In all other cases, define ,( )M jU  as in Lemma 4.3. 
Extend to the whole of *D  by taking sums as in Theorem 4.4. 
Not CS, but NP, AN, TP. For *,M jU D  with ={ }M j  define ,( ) = 0i M jU  for all 
\{ }i N j  and ,( ) = 1.j M jU  In all other cases, define ,( )M jU  as in Lemma 4.3. 
Extend to the whole of *D  by taking sums as in Theorem 4.4. 
Not AN, but CS, NP, TP. For *,M jU D  with | |= 2M  and j M  (hence 3n  ) 
define ,( ) = 0i M jU  for all { },i M j   also, for i M  when >i k  and = { , },M i k
,( ) = 1,k M jU  and ,( ) = 1j M jU  . In all other cases, define ,( )M jU  as in Lemma 4.3. 
Extend to the whole of *D  by taking sums as in Theorem 4.4. 
Not TP, but AN, CS, NP. For *CD  define 
1 2= |{ : ( ) , = }|, = |{ : ( ) = , }|i in i N C i C O n i N C i C O      
If 
1 2, > 0,n n  then define 
1
2
1/ if ( ) , =
( ) = 1/ if ( ) = ,
0 otherwise
i
i i
n C i C O
C n C i C O
 

  


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and define ( ) = (0, ..., 0)C  in all other cases. To see that   does not satisfy TP, let = 4n  
and consider *,C DD  with (1) = 2,C  (3) = 4,D  and ( ), ( ) =C S D S   in all other 
cases. Then ( ) ( ) = (1/ 2, 1/ 2, 1/ 2, 1/ 2),C D C D       whereas 
( ) = (1, 1, 0, 0)C   and ( ) = (0, 0, 1, 1)D  , thus violating (1) and therefore TP. 
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